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REPRESENTATIONALISM REVISITED 
 
Huw Price 
 
 
 
I am very grateful to Diego Lawler and Eleonora Orlando, to María 
Frápolli, and to David Macarthur, for their thoughtful responses to 
“Naturalism without representationalism” on the occasion of its publication in 
Spanish. There is much to discuss in all three papers, but the most challenging 
response by far is that of Lawler and Orlando. Accordingly, given constraints 
of space and time, I shall concentrate on replying to their piece (drawing on 
Frápolli’s paper at one point, in support of my response to one of their 
challenges). 
I think I disagree with Lawler and Orlando on four main points. The 
first three of these concern my claim that object naturalism runs into problems 
with the placement problem for semantic vocabulary. I argue that the object 
naturalist’s general methodology turns out to be inapplicable to the special case 
of the semantic vocabulary, in virtue of the way in which that methodology 
presupposes semantic notions such as reference and truth; and Lawler and 
Orlando disagree with this argument in several ways.  
As Lawler and Orlando note, I make the claim in question in a 
conditional form, initially, under the assumption that placement problems 
originate at the linguistic level, as issues about the role of particular terms, 
concepts or ‘vocabularies’ – moral terms, say, or causal terms, or semantic terms. 
Under this assumption, the object naturalist thinks of the placement problem 
as something like the question “To what natural entities or properties, if any, 
do these terms refer?” I note (2004a, Section 5) that if the question is genuinely 
posed at the linguistic level (rather than being a mere invocation of Quine’s 
deflationary ‘semantic ascent’), then the notion of reference in question here 
must be a substantial one – a subtantial word–world relation. My objections to 
object naturalism turn on the consequences of this fact, when the placement 
spotlight turns on the semantic vocabulary itself. 
Lawler and Orlando recognise the role of the assumption of a linguistic 
conception of the placement problem, and follow me in taking that 
assumption to be in place, in formulating their initial objection to my 
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argument. I shall continue to assume it, for the moment, in replying to their 
objections. (I shall turn to the material conception in Section 4 below.) 
 
1. OBJECT NATURALISM AND THE EMPIRICAL CONTINGENCY OF SEMANTIC 
RELATIONS 
 
Lawler and Orlando’s first objection concerns my claim that object 
naturalism cannot adopt its own preferred attitude of ‘empirical contingency’ 
towards the semantic notions on which it depends. As I put it the challenge: 
 
 Naturalism of this kind seems to be committed to the empirical contingency 
of semantic relations. For any given term or sentence, it must be to some 
extent an empirical matter whether, and if so to what, that terms refers; 
whether, and if so where, it has a truthmaker. However, it seems impossible 
to make sense of this empirical attitude with respect to the semantic terms 
themselves. (Price, 2004a, p. 81)   
 
Lawler and Orlando respond:  
 
 It is not at all clear to us why the object naturalist could not take reference 
and truth to be contingent semantic relations, namely, why she could not 
think that there might have been other semantic relations or no semantic 
relations at all. The alleged fact that in the actual world the adequate semantic 
relations are substantial reference and truth is perfectly compatible with 
thinking that there are other worlds where there are other semantic relations 
in play and even some worlds, where there are no human beings and no 
natural language is thus spoken or written, where there aren’t any kind of 
semantic relations whatsoever. (p. 28) 
 
However, I think that this response turns on a misunderstanding of the 
kind of contingency I had in mind. It is an epistemic contingency, an open-
mindedness about what the progress of empirical science will reveal to be the 
case about the actual world. My point – adapted, as I say, from Boghossian – is 
that to the extent that the object naturalist’s methodology presupposes substantial 
semantic relations, it cannot adopt this attitude of empirical open-mindedness 
towards the semantic vocabulary itself. So semantic vocabulary is bound to be 
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an outlier – a placement problem not amenable to the kind of treatment the 
object naturalist requires as a global model.   
Once again, I stress that the assumption of a linguistic conception of 
the placement problem is playing a crucial role here. I am not denying that 
such questions about semantic relations can be posed in material mode. In that 
mode, we would be asking not whether the semantic vocabulary refers to anything. but 
simply whether there are semantic relations. It is the former formulation that creates 
the difficulty.  
Later in their paper, Lawler and Orlando themselves describe the 
‘material’ version of this empirical attitude, distinguishing two questions an 
object naturalist may ask in this mode: 
 
 [T]here are two different questions for an object naturalist to pose: on the 
one hand, she may wonder whether she is entitled to posit substantial 
semantic relations, namely, whether that kind of relations fit in her general 
naturalistic ontological commitment; on the other hand, she may wonder 
whether positing them satisfies any theoretical need. As far as the former 
question is concerned, the object naturalist takes it to be an open empirical 
question, which must be answered on the basis of an empirical search. Price 
points out that there is no automatic entitlement; but why should the 
entitlement be automatic? Far from that, we think that for an object naturalist 
the entitlement question can only be settled by reflecting on whether there is 
a well-developed conception of substantial semantic relations that becomes 
acceptable by naturalistic standards. As for the question of whether 
substantial semantic relations are needed, the object naturalist has given a 
positive answer to it: they are needed to explain meaning. (pp. 32-33) 
 
I will return to these remarks later (see Section 5), and especially to the 
last point, which, as Lawler and Orlando appreciate, offers a challenge to the 
deflationism on which my Wittgensteinian pluralism depends.  
For the moment, though –following the structure of my original paper, 
and of Lawler and Orlando’s own faithfulness to that structure, in their 
response– I am assuming a linguistic conception of the origin of placement 
problems. In this linguistic mode, the fundamental empirical question is not 
whether there are semantic relations, but whether the semantic vocabulary refers 
to anything. And it is this circularity that is the source of the difficulty. The 
‘open empirical question’ cannot be genuinely open, in this case, because it is 
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itself couched in substantial semantic vocabulary –it is the question ‘According 
to empirical science, does this vocabulary actually refer?’ 
2. BOGHOSSIAN’S ARGUMENT 
As I noted above, I took myself to be following Boghossian at this 
point in my argument. I think that Lawler and Orlando miss the crux of 
Boghossian’s objection to (a certain kind of) semantic anti-realism. They say:  
 
 From the premise that the semantic anti-realist has to use language to state 
her thesis and express her disagreement with the realist, it does not follow 
that she has to subscribe to the realists term’s: what she is presupposing is 
that there is an alternative explanation of what she is doing, which does not 
appeal to substantial reference and truth – it may be even a purely physical 
phenomenon, fully accountable in neurological terms, or a completely pragmatic 
one. (p. 29) 
 
However, the problem that Boghossian identifies for the semantic anti-
realist is not an objection to the possibility of some such alternative ‘non-
semantic’ account of language; it is an objection to the anti-realist’s specific 
(negative) thesis about the semantic vocabulary, namely, that it fails to refer to 
anything. Boghossian’s point is that in saying this, the anti-realist has to use the 
very language about which she claims to be an anti-realist.  
As I note (Price 2004a, pp. 79–80), I part company from Boghossian in 
pointing that not all opponents of “big R” semantic Realism fall victim to his 
objection. A semantic deflationist can escape it, simply by abandoning the 
negative claim – abandoning the semantic vocabulary altogether, for theoretical 
purposes. (This leaves any alternative ‘non-semantic’ account of language 
untouched, of course.) But this escape route is no help to the object naturalist 
hoping to hold open anti-realism about semantic properties and relations (i.e., 
as she puts it, the view that semantic terms fail to refer) as a live empirical 
possibility – something that future science might reveal to us to be true. This is 
why I think that Boghossian’s argument “pave[s] the way for adopting ... 
subject naturalism”, as Lawler and Orlando put it, while denying that  “if one 
accepted [Boghossian’s] argument, one wouldn’t be able to help being 
committed to substantial reference and truth.” Like Boghossian himself, 
Lawler and Orlando overlook the possibility and consequences of semantic 
deflationism.  
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3. R* AND R** 
I think that Lawler and Orlando also miss the crux of an argument 
(Price 2014a, p. 83) which I intended to show how the object naturalist project 
of finding the referents of our terms must go wrong for the semantic terms 
themselves. In reply to this argument, Lawler and Orlando say the following: 
 
 For the object naturalist, ‘reference’ is in no way different from ‘light’ and the 
rest of theoretical terms: there might be different empirical conceptions about 
the intended phenomena, and finding strong evidence for a certain theory is the 
only way to choose among them. So, in as far as she may say that according to 
our best physical theory, ‘light’ refers to the so and so, she may also say that 
according to our best semantic theory, ‘reference’ refers to the such and such. (p. 
30) 
 
Lawler and Orlando note “the fact that the term ‘light’ might be 
interpreted or understood in two or more different ways (as it happens, some 
have thought that it refers to a particle whereas others took it to refer to a 
wave)”. But the point is that the claims “The term ‘light’ refers to a particle” 
and “The term ‘light’ refers to a wave” are incompatible. Whereas “The term 
‘refer’ refers to relation R*” and  “The term ‘refer’ refers to relation R**” need 
not be at all incompatible, by the lights of proponents of these claims – for the 
apparent disagreement provides explicit evidence of ambiguity. The proponent 
of the first claim takes herself to be saying that the term ‘refer’ stands in 
relation R* to relation R*, while the proponent of the second claim takes 
herself to be saying that the term ‘refer’ stands in relation R** to relation R**. 
And these two claims need not be incompatible.  
What if speaker 1 interprets speaker 2 in her own (i.e., speaker 1’s) 
terms, and vice versa? Then, indeed, each thinks that there is a genuine dispute. 
But each has a different view about what dispute it is. One thinks that the 
disagreement is about whether ‘refer’ stands in relation R* to R* or to R**; the 
other thinks that it is about whether ‘refer’ stands in relation R** to R* or to 
R**. Once again, then, they talk at cross-purposes.  
Moreover, it is no help for the object naturalist to appeal to semantic 
externalism at this point, e.g., by way of the notion that the natural relation that 
both parties can agree on having in mind is the one that actually acts as a 
reference-magnet for the term ‘refer’. “Quite so”, they will both say, and still 
find themselves talking past one another. One thinks that R* is an R*-magnet 
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for the term ‘refer’, the other that R** is an R**-magnet for the term ‘refer’ –
they are still not disagreeing. 
So, by the lights of an object naturalist who construes the placement 
project in linguistic terms –and for whom, accordingly, substantial semantic 
relations such as reference play an essential role in the formulation of the 
questions at the core of the placement issue– the stance with respect to these 
relations themselves cannot be the open-minded empirical stance that such a 
naturalist adopts with respect to everything else. Once again, this is simply a 
consequence of the way in which, on this linguistic construal, these notions are 
presupposed by the investigative stance. 
4. THE MATERIAL OPTION 
In Section 3 of their paper, Lawler and Orlando turn to the second 
horn of the dilemma I try to present for object naturalism, namely, the option 
of saying that placement problems begin at the material level. On this view, as 
I put it,  
 
 the starting point is the object itself. We are simply acquainted with X, and 
hence –in the light of a commitment to object naturalism– come to wonder 
how this thing-with-which-we-are-acquainted could be the kind of thing 
studied by science. (Price, 2004a, p. 75) 
 
At the end of my paper I turn to the question whether object 
naturalism can evade my objections by adopting the material conception.” I 
argue –“albeit somewhat tentatively,’’ as I put it– “that this is not a live 
option.” (Price, 2004a, p. 76) 
I offer two arguments for this conclusion. The first argument is that 
the cat is out of the bag, as I put it: linguistic ways of deflating placement 
problems are already on the table, and it takes substantial semantic 
commitments to set them aside, and defend a space for the metaphysical 
projects they seek to undermine. 
The second argument points out how semantic notions have become 
part of the toolkit of contemporary metaphysics –including, notably, the 
programme widely seen as a preferred model for contemporary naturalist 
metaphysics, the so-called Canberra Plan. To the extent that this is so, a 
linguistic conception of the starting point is built in from the start. 
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My argument for the latter point turns on the claim that if the Canberra 
Plan wants to avail itself of a generalisation of Lewis famous argument for 
physicalism, it needs to allow that semantic roles do the work that causal roles do 
for Lewis –and this shift once again puts semantics at the core of the 
metaphysical enterprise, defeating any attempt to remain on the material plane. 
It is clear that I failed to explain this point clearly in my paper– Lawler and 
Orlando say that they find it “utterly mysterious”! Rather than attempt to do 
better here, I simply refer curious readers to my best attempt to make the 
point, in a joint paper with Peter Menzies (Menzies and Price, 2009); see also 
Price (2009). 
What about the cat and the bag? On this point, I note that the linguistic 
conception of the placement issue is already in play in contemporary 
discussions of the placement problem, citing noncognitivism as a clear 
example: 
 
The threat to object naturalism takes off from this point, noting that the 
representationalist assumption is non-compulsory – that there are other 
possible theoretical approaches to language, in which semantic notions play 
no significant role. We have thus been offered the prospect of a (subject) 
naturalistic account of the relevant aspects of human talk and thought, from 
the perspective of which the material question (‘What are Xs?’) simply doesn’t 
arise. At this stage, the only way for object naturalists to regain control of the 
ball is to defend the representationalist assumption (a project fraught with 
difficulty, for the reasons noted above). (Price, 2004a, p. 84) 
 
The point doesn’t depend on noncognitivism in its traditional form, 
however –it works equally well for the kind of deflationary Wittgensteinian 
pluralism that I favour. As I put it: 
 
The difficult opponent [for the object naturalist] is the naturalist who takes 
advantage of a non-representationalist theoretical perspective to avoid the 
material mode altogether. If such an opponent can explain why natural 
creatures in a natural environment come to talk in these plural ways — of 
“truth”, “value”, “meaning”, “causation”, and all the rest — what puzzle 
remains? What debt does philosophy now owe to science? (Price, 2004a, p. 
87) 
 
In a more recent piece, I explain the point this way:  
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The ... job of the cat, as personified by the early noncognitivists, was to make 
us sensitive to the issue as to what we are doing with language – to encourage 
us to question the ‘transparency’ of language, in Russell’s metaphor. Once this 
issue has been raised, once we have learnt to make the sideways, 
anthropological glance at our own ways of speaking, then the option of 
handling placement problems entirely at the linguistic level is on the table. At 
this point, there’s no going back: the cat is out of the bag. What it takes to 
return us to metaphysics is a particular kind of answer to what is first and 
foremost an anthropological question. (Price et al, 2013, p. 185) 
 
The question I have in mind, of course, is a question about language – 
roughly, the question “what is going on” when we speak of “truth”, “value”, 
“meaning”, “causation”, or whatever it is. And the answer needed to return us 
to the material mode is the Representationalist one: the view that these terms 
stand in (or purport to stand in) substantial semantic relations to items in the 
world. In this way, the cat forces the object naturalist’s hand – forces her to 
defend Representationalism. And this, as I put it, “is a recipe for grave 
discomfort”. (Price, 2004a, p. 87) 
I think that Lawler and Orlando misunderstand this challenge to object 
naturalist, interpreting it as the claim that answers to material questions might 
turn out to require language-involving answers:  
 
[T]he object naturalist may think that ‘the things that we humans do with 
language’ are not directly relevant to answering questions concerning, for 
instance, the nature of values, causes or modal facts. ... [P]rima facie those are 
questions concerning things rather than terms, namely, ontological questions. 
So, prima facie, without further argument, there is no reason to think that 
ontological issues can be settled by reflecting upon our own linguistic 
practices. If an object naturalist did not take the nature of values, for instance, 
to depend on our use of evaluative expressions or our making evaluative 
judgments under certain conditions, she would have no inclination to start off 
with either a semantic analysis of evaluative expressions or a pragmatic 
analysis of evaluative force. ... Therefore, unless such an argument is provided 
(namely, an argument concerning the propriety ... of reducing morality to 
speech acts of moral evaluation ...), Price’s first consideration [i.e., ‘the cat is 
out of the bag’] against taking the material mode option is not, from our 
perspective, adequately justified. The Wittgensteinian picture that Price is so 
happy about may be a point of arrival, after some forceful arguments for it 
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are provided, but cannot be a point of departure in arguing against the object 
naturalist – unless one does not mind begging the question. (pp. 34-35) 
 
Here Lawler and Orlando fail to see that my “Wittgensteinian picture” 
is not an answer couched in linguistic terms to the metaphysical question (i.e., 
in this case, the question “What is the nature of value?”). It is an answer to a 
entirely different question, a question about language: “What is the function 
and genealogy of talk of ‘value’?” (As I put it, this is an anthropological question, 
not a metaphysical question.)  
This Wittgensteinian picture is not in itself a point of departure, of 
course. But it puts in play the linguistic point of departure – the suggestion that 
placement problems be resolved at the linguistic level. To defend her 
metaphysical stance, in the light of this possibility, the object naturalist needs 
to defend Representationalism. In other words, she needs substantial semantic 
properties and relations, and then faces the difficulties discussed above in 
virtue of the special role that these notions play in her general programme. 
That’s why the escape to the material mode doesn’t work.  
5. A CHALLENGE TO DEFLATIONISM 
Finally, I want to turn to the challenge that I deferred earlier – a 
challenge Lawler and Orlando raise to my semantic deflationism. 
 
The real challenge is ... offering an adequate theory of our linguistic practices 
that does not appeal to substantial reference and truth; to put it in Price’s ... 
words, the deflationist has to manage to be very specific about how she 
‘couches her theoretical claims about the terms concerned in other terms 
entirely’. If exploiting a use account were the only hope for a deflationist, she 
may not end up representing a viable theoretical alternative after all: as it is 
known, use accounts do not afford acceptable semantic explanations for all 
kinds of natural language expressions – take, for instance, proper names, 
natural kind general terms and indexicals. In the light of that, the object 
naturalism could still claim that substantial reference and truth are needed to 
explain meaning: it is then the answer to the above-mentioned need question 
that would provide her with a clear motivation to posit those substantial 
semantic concepts. (pp. 33-34)  
 
96 |                                                                                                   Huw Price        Hu 
Análisis. Revista de Investigación filosófica, Vol. 1, nº 1, 2014 
I agree with Lawler and Orlando that there is an important theoretical 
issue here, namely, the issue as to whether an adequate theory of language 
needs substantial word–world relations. We semantic deflationists need to say 
‘no’. The objection is that we thereby lose our entitlement to the insights of 
important parts of linguistic theory – precisely those parts whose success is 
claimed to provide “a clear motivation to posit ... substantial semantic 
concepts”, as Lawler and Orlando put it.1  
This is a large issue, that deserves a more thorough treatment than I 
can give it here, but I want to indicate the direction that I think the deflationist 
must take. Essentially, it is to call attention to a possibility that Lawler and 
Orlando overlook, namely, that the work done by these notions in semantic 
theory is entirely compatible with deflationism, and therefore doesn’t require 
substantial semantic properties and relations. Elsewhere (Price, 2004b) I have 
made this point in terms of a distinction drawn by Michael Dummett between 
two conceptions of the goal of a theory of meaning. A modest theory of 
meaning helps itself freely to the conceptual resources of the object language 
in question; a full-blooded theory of meaning avoids doing so. A familiar point in 
discussions of that period was that the modest project goes hand in hand with 
a deflationary attitude to the semantic vocabulary employed in semantic theory. 
All deflationists are then committed to the view that to the extent that 
semantic vocabulary plays an important role linguistic theory, the theories in 
question actually fall on the modest side of the line. Conversely, an opponent 
who wants to argue, with Lawler and Orlando, that there is essential theoretical 
work for substantial semantic notions, needs to produce an example which is 
indubitably immodest.  
I think it is helpful to distinguish two views of the place of semantic 
notions in linguistic theory along a different dimension. One possibility is that 
they are ‘upstream of language’, needed to characterise the functions that 
language evolves to serve – think of Millikan’s famous work on representation 
(e.g., Millikan, 2005) for a view of this kind. The other possibility is that they 
are ‘downstream of language’, being notions ‘internal to the language game’, 
notions that we use to speak about language ‘from within’. A deflationist sees 
reference and truth in the latter light, of course. But as the project of a modest 
theory of meaning illustrates, this stance is compatible, at least prima facie, 
                                                
1 John MacFarlane (2014) raises a similar challenge in his recent review of my Expressivism, 
Pragmatism and Representationalism. 
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with thinking that there is interesting theoretical work that can be done with 
notions. (One of the traps here is to think that we must limit ourselves to a 
single notion of meaning, so that these two theoretical perspectives are 
mutually exclusive. On the contrary, in my view, there are interesting things to 
be said from both of them; again, see Price, 2004b.) 
One of the great advantages of thinking of reference and truth as 
‘downstream’ in this way –rather than as substantial word–world relations 
needed to characterise language ‘from the outside’– is that it offers an easy 
solution to a difficulty that Frápolli discusses in her insightful paper. Frápolli 
cites Benacerraf, calling attention to “the concern for having a homogeneous 
semantical theory in which semantics for the propositions of mathematics 
parallel the semantics for the rest of the language”, and the difficulty of 
reconciling this with “a reasonable epistemology” for mathematics. As Frápolli 
points out, the difficulty is not unique to mathematics: it “remains unaltered if 
the focus is extended to non-empirical contents of any kind”. But so long as 
our semantical theory is ‘downstream’, in my sense, the problem has an easy 
solution: in this case the uniformity of the various domains, empirical and non-
empirical, is simply the uniformity of the assertoric form of language, whose 
commonalities we may exploit (from the inside, as it were) for various 
theoretical purposes, such as those of a modest theory of meaning, in 
Dummett’s sense. The inhomogeneities between domains lies elsewhere –in 
the different “practices” on which different domains depend, as Frápolli puts 
it. (Frápolli’s invocation of Strawson in support of this view of the place of 
semantical notions such as truth and fact –the view that they are ‘downstream’, 
in my terminology– seems to me precisely right.)  
The view that I share with Frápolli plays a key role in my version of 
pragmatism, and of naturalism without Representationalism. Indeed, in the 
introduction to Naturalism Without Mirrors I characterise it as the “single key 
point”, to the extent that there is one, and put it like this: 
 
In so far as our claims are representational, it seems plausible to assume that 
they are uniformly representational, whatever the subject-matter –in other 
words, that representation is a univocal notion, in this sense. But if 
representation is viewed as relation to our natural environment, univocity 
leads to the placement problem in an acute form. The problem is solved by 
abandoning the external notion of representation in favour of an internal 
notion; by recognising that the grip of the alternative picture rests in large part 
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on the disquotational platitudes; and by insisting that we theorise about our 
relations to our natural environment in a different, non-semantic vocabulary. 
So long as we practice our naturalism in another key – in the pragmatic, 
functional dimension that opens up when we abandon Representationalism – 
we retain univocity where it matters, while avoiding the placement problems 
altogether. (Price, 2011, pp. 32–33) 
 
But I stress two things. First, this viewpoint is entirely compatible with 
thinking that there is a legitimate external, covariational notion of 
representation, applicable to some vocabularies – the mistake is simply to 
confuse this external notion with the ordinary semantic notions, in my view. 
Second, much of formal philosophy of language can be done in the internal 
key. As I put it: 
 
[M]uch of the formal machinery of philosophy of language seems entirely 
compatible with the present viewpoint, so long as it is thought of in this 
internal way, as formalising and describing the structures and relations 
characteristic of language at the higher, homogeneous, level – the level which 
is blind to the underlying functional distinctions associated with the origins 
and roles of particular groups of concepts. (Price, 2011, p. 24) 
 
To back up this instinct, or alternatively to show it mistaken, we need 
to examine in more detail the various contexts in linguistic theory in which 
semantic terms seem to play a crucial role. We deflationists put our money on 
the claim that all such contexts go one of two ways: either the use of semantic 
terms is compatible with a deflationary reading, or the piece of theory in 
question is bad theory –one that we would be better off without. Our 
Representationalist opponents need a case which can be plausibly argued to go 
in neither direction –in other words, a case which depends on substantial 
semantic notions, and achieves some theoretical insight or end that even a 
deflationist will agree we should not discard. Lawler and Orlando are quite 
right, in my view, to call attention to this issue; but I have yet to see a reason 
for thinking that deflationists should be nervous.  
 
Huw Price 
University of Cambridge 
hp331@cam.ac.uk 
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